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@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
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#include "addrman.h"
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#include "alert.h"
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#include "bloom.h"
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#include "chainparams.h"
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#include "checkpoints.h"
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#include "checkqueue.h"
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@@ -126,10 +125,6 @@ namespace {
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} // anon namespace
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// Forward reference functions defined here:
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static const unsigned int MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM = 1000;
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static void RelayDoubleSpend(const COutPoint& outPoint, const CTransaction& doubleSpend, bool fInBlock, CBloomFilter& filter);
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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//
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// dispatching functions
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@@ -152,25 +147,10 @@ struct CMainSignals {
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boost::signals2::signal<void (const uint256 &)> Inventory;
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// Tells listeners to broadcast their data.
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boost::signals2::signal<void ()> Broadcast;
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// Notifies listeners of detection of a double-spent transaction. Arguments are outpoint that is
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// double-spent, first transaction seen, double-spend transaction, and whether the second double-spend
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// transaction was first seen in a block.
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// Note: only notifies if the previous transaction is in the memory pool; if previous transction was in a block,
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// then the double-spend simply fails when we try to lookup the inputs in the current UTXO set.
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boost::signals2::signal<void (const COutPoint&, const CTransaction&, bool)> DetectedDoubleSpend;
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} g_signals;
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} // anon namespace
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void RegisterInternalSignals() {
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static CBloomFilter doubleSpendFilter;
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seed_insecure_rand();
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doubleSpendFilter = CBloomFilter(MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM, 0.01, insecure_rand(), BLOOM_UPDATE_NONE);
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g_signals.DetectedDoubleSpend.connect(boost::bind(RelayDoubleSpend, _1, _2, _3, doubleSpendFilter));
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}
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void RegisterWallet(CWalletInterface* pwalletIn) {
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g_signals.SyncTransaction.connect(boost::bind(&CWalletInterface::SyncTransaction, pwalletIn, _1, _2));
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g_signals.EraseTransaction.connect(boost::bind(&CWalletInterface::EraseFromWallet, pwalletIn, _1));
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@@ -890,22 +870,6 @@ int64_t GetMinRelayFee(const CTransaction& tx, unsigned int nBytes, bool fAllowF
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return nMinFee;
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}
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// Exponentially limit the rate of nSize flow to nLimit. nLimit unit is thousands-per-minute.
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bool RateLimitExceeded(double& dCount, int64_t& nLastTime, int64_t nLimit, unsigned int nSize)
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{
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static CCriticalSection csLimiter;
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int64_t nNow = GetTime();
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LOCK(csLimiter);
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// Use an exponentially decaying ~10-minute window:
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dCount *= pow(1.0 - 1.0/600.0, (double)(nNow - nLastTime));
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nLastTime = nNow;
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if (dCount >= nLimit*10*1000)
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return true;
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dCount += nSize;
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return false;
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}
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bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransaction &tx, bool fLimitFree,
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bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fRejectInsaneFee)
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@@ -940,10 +904,9 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++)
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{
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COutPoint outpoint = tx.vin[i].prevout;
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// Does tx conflict with a member of the pool, and is it not equivalent to that member?
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if (pool.mapNextTx.count(outpoint) && !tx.IsEquivalentTo(*pool.mapNextTx[outpoint].ptx))
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if (pool.mapNextTx.count(outpoint))
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{
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g_signals.DetectedDoubleSpend(outpoint, tx, false);
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// Disable replacement feature for now
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return false;
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}
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}
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@@ -1015,15 +978,23 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
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// be annoying or make others' transactions take longer to confirm.
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if (fLimitFree && nFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))
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{
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static CCriticalSection csFreeLimiter;
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static double dFreeCount;
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static int64_t nLastFreeTime;
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static int64_t nFreeLimit = GetArg("-limitfreerelay", 15);
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static int64_t nLastTime;
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int64_t nNow = GetTime();
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if (RateLimitExceeded(dFreeCount, nLastFreeTime, nFreeLimit, nSize))
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LOCK(csFreeLimiter);
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// Use an exponentially decaying ~10-minute window:
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dFreeCount *= pow(1.0 - 1.0/600.0, (double)(nNow - nLastTime));
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nLastTime = nNow;
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// -limitfreerelay unit is thousand-bytes-per-minute
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// At default rate it would take over a month to fill 1GB
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if (dFreeCount >= GetArg("-limitfreerelay", 15)*10*1000)
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return state.DoS(0, error("AcceptToMemoryPool : free transaction rejected by rate limiter"),
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REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient priority");
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LogPrint("mempool", "Rate limit dFreeCount: %g => %g\n", dFreeCount, dFreeCount+nSize);
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dFreeCount += nSize;
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}
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if (fRejectInsaneFee && nFees > ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) * 10000)
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@@ -1046,49 +1017,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
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return true;
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}
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static void
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RelayDoubleSpend(const COutPoint& outPoint, const CTransaction& doubleSpend, bool fInBlock, CBloomFilter& filter)
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{
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// Relaying double-spend attempts to our peers lets them detect when
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// somebody might be trying to cheat them. However, blindly relaying
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// every double-spend across the entire network gives attackers
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// a denial-of-service attack: just generate a stream of double-spends
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// re-spending the same (limited) set of outpoints owned by the attacker.
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// So, we use a bloom filter and only relay (at most) the first double
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// spend for each outpoint. False-positives ("we have already relayed")
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// are OK, because if the peer doesn't hear about the double-spend
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// from us they are very likely to hear about it from another peer, since
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// each peer uses a different, randomized bloom filter.
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if (fInBlock || filter.contains(outPoint)) return;
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// Apply an independent rate limit to double-spend relays
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static double dRespendCount;
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static int64_t nLastRespendTime;
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static int64_t nRespendLimit = GetArg("-limitrespendrelay", 100);
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unsigned int nSize = ::GetSerializeSize(doubleSpend, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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if (RateLimitExceeded(dRespendCount, nLastRespendTime, nRespendLimit, nSize))
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{
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LogPrint("mempool", "Double-spend relay rejected by rate limiter\n");
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return;
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}
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LogPrint("mempool", "Rate limit dRespendCount: %g => %g\n", dRespendCount, dRespendCount+nSize);
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// Clear the filter on average every MAX_DOUBLE_SPEND_BLOOM
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// insertions
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if (insecure_rand()%MAX_DOUBLESPEND_BLOOM == 0)
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filter.clear();
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filter.insert(outPoint);
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RelayTransaction(doubleSpend);
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// Share conflict with wallet
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g_signals.SyncTransaction(doubleSpend, NULL);
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}
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int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChainINTERNAL(CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
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{
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