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Bugfix: Grammar fixes

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This commit is contained in:
Corinne Dashjr
2015-04-28 14:48:28 +00:00
committed by Luke Dashjr
parent 18d2832678
commit 7e6d23b171
30 changed files with 79 additions and 80 deletions
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20
src/main.cpp
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@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
// do all inputs exist?
// Note that this does not check for the presence of actual outputs (see the next check for that),
// only helps filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
// and only helps with filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn txin, tx.vin) {
if (!view.HaveCoins(txin.prevout.hash)) {
if (pfMissingInputs)
@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex* pindexNewForkTip)
pfork = pfork->pprev;
}
// We define a condition which we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
// who's tip is within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
// We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
// with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
// We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just under 10% of sustained network
// hash rate operating on the fork.
// or a chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this should be detected by both)
@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
// See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
// This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool
// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
// This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
// initial block download.
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) {
if (nUpgraded > 100/2)
{
// strMiscWarning is read by GetWarnings(), called by Qt and the JSON-RPC code to warn the user:
strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete, upgrade required!");
strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete; upgrade required!");
CAlert::Notify(strMiscWarning, true);
fWarned = true;
}
@@ -3732,7 +3732,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock);
// CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see
// This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didnt send here -
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here -
// they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block.
// Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here,
// however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs
@@ -4059,7 +4059,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) {
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash);
if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) {
// First request the headers preceeding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
// First request the headers preceding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
// case where a new block is announced that succeeds the current tip (no reorganization),
// there are no such headers.
// Secondly, and only when we are close to being synced, we request the announced block directly,
@@ -4466,7 +4466,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
// Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
sProblem = "Nonce mismatch";
if (nonce == 0) {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Nonce zero";
}
@@ -4475,7 +4475,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping";
}
} else {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Short payload";
}
@@ -4918,7 +4918,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
// In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for (2 + 0.5 * N) times the block interval
// (with N the number of validated blocks that were in flight at the time it was requested), disconnect due to
// timeout. We compensate for in-flight blocks to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertize nonexisting block hashes
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
// to unreasonably increase our timeout.
if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0 && state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nTime < nNow - 500000 * consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (4 + state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nValidatedQueuedBefore)) {
LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", state.vBlocksInFlight.front().hash.ToString(), pto->id);